average performance, the record of each service was reduced to an effective annual rate which was then weighted in accordance with the length of the period represented. The average annual effective rate of all the services, thus arrived at, is -1.43 per cent. In an attempt to determine whether the service having the best record achieved its result through skill or chance, we resorted to the theories of compound and inverse probability. Our conclusion is thus rendered consistent by obtaining approximately the same answer in two different ways.
With the aid of various checks, involving 1250 computations of the action of individual stocks selected at random, we derived a formula, A.D. (t) =5.42+1.5t (A.D. =average deviation, t, in units of 4 weeks, > 1), representing the deviation, for all periods from one month up to one year, of the average individual stock from the average of all stocks.
Service Number 1, for the 9 six months' periods from January 1, 1928 to July 1, 1932, was successful 7 times and unsuccessful 2 times. With the aid of the table referred to, the averages of "chances in 1000 to do worse" for the 7 periods in which it was successful and the 2 periods in which it was unsuccessful were found to be 842 and 66 respectively. By the theory of direct probabilities, the probability of a single service being right at least 7 times in 9 is equal to the sum of the first 3 terms of the binomial 0 + )9. p = 1/29+9/29+36/29 = 46/512= .090
The probability that a single service could in 9 predictions be 7 times on the positive side and in these 7 forecasts equal the achievement of Service Number 1 is, P =.090 X (1 -.842) =.014 However, the record of the best service is marred by its failure in the two negative cases. The average of the two chances to do worse in these cases is .066. We then have, Q = (7/9) X.842+2/9 X.066 =.670 as the probability of a single random service having a record worse than that of Service Number 1. We therefore conclude that the probability that a random service can, first, be on the right side of the market 7 times out of 9, and second, equal in performance the record of Service Number 1, is P =.090 X (1 -.670) = .030. This means that in 16 services we should expect to find 16 X .030 = .48 services which will equal the record of Service Number 1. That is to say, the chance is even that we should get at least one service as good as Number 1.
Because of the assumptions implied in this computation, we shall argue this another way. We shall assume that the probability that a service for its total forecast shall be on the positive side of the market is 1/2. Then the estimate of its success must be made by a different evaluation of Q. For this purpose we shall adopt a formula suggested by Bayes' rule in inverse probability in which the weights .910 and .090 instead of 7/9 and 2/9 are used. We get .910 (.842) Q = -.901 .910 (.842) + (.090) (.934) Hence, if a service was on the right side of the market, the probability of its achieving the success of Service Number 1 would be 1-Q. Thus the compound probability would be P=1/2 (1-.901)=.050.
Among the 16 services the probability of the most successful one equalling the record of Service Number 1 would be P = 16 X .050 = .80, that is to say, we should expect to get among 16 random services about one service which would equal Number 1. Since this answer is quite consistent with our previous answer, our analysis suggests the conclusion that the record of Service Number 1 could not be definitely attributed to skill.
TWENTY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANIES
The second analysis deals with the common stock investments, from 1928 to 1931 inclusive, of 20 of our leading fire insurance companies. Its significance lies in the fact that these companies are representative of a class of common stock investor which has had long years of experience and large amounts of capital at its disposal. Fire insurance dates from the Great London Fire of 1666, and active investment in stocks developed during the nineteenth century. The fire insurance companies are much older hands at the business of investment than either the financial services, which are a twentieth century product, or American investment trusts, which are largely a development of the last few years. The investment policies of these companies are based on the accumulated knowledge of successive boards of directors whose judgment might be presumed, over the years, to have been well above that of the average investor. The 20 companies which were selected for analysis hold assets totalling several hundred million dollars, and seem a fair sample of their kind.
Fire insurance companies carry between 20 and 30 per cent of their total investments in common stocks. Their average turnover amounts to only some 5 per cent a year. For this reason it was thought best to confine our analysis to the record of the actual purchases and sales made during the period under examination, rather than to compute the record of the entire common stock portfolio. To simplify the labor, all items of stock purchased were given equal weights, regardless of the amounts involved. While the conclusion does not exactly reflect the actual investment results secured by these companies, it should, however, provide a satisfactory test of the success of these organizations in selecting stocks which performed better than the average.
The method employed in the analysis is essentially the same as that used in the case of the investment services. A second purchase of an item was omitted from the record unless a sale of this item intervened. A record of the sale of an item, of course, determined the date as of which it was dropped from the list. Also, any item of which there had been no purchase recorded for 12 months was automatically considered sold.
The compounded records of the 20 companies for the 4-year period are shown in Table II .
Six of the companies show evidence of success, and the average of the 20 is -4.72 per cent. The average record of the companies in the stocks which they selected for investment fell below the average of the stock market at the effective annual rate of 1.20 per cent. A comparable result could have been achieved through a purely random selection of stocks. The analysis of the fire insurance companies' records thus confirms the results secured in appraising the records of the financial services. The records show that only one-third of the list met with any success. In order to derive a significant average of the performance of the entire group the results listed above have been reduced to effective annual rates, and each has been given a weight to conform with the length of the record analysed. After these adjustments, we are enabled to conclude that the average forecasting agency fell approximately 4 per cent per annum below a record representing the average of all performances achievable by pure chance. This would seem to indicate that, in general, these stock market forecasters failed to accomplish their objective. The most that can be said in extenuation is that the long-continued decline in securities has been, naturally, a handicap to a group which, taking warning from the experience of Cassandra, usually seems constrained to look on the bright side. During the 4' year period under analysis the number of weeks in which the stock market declined almost exactly equalled the number of weeks in which advances were recorded, and the total amount of the declines considerably exceeded the total amount of the advances. Yet we recorded during this period 2035 bullish, 804 bearish, and 479 doubtful forecasts. Further, we note that in 1928, the only year the market showed a net gain, the excess of bullish over bearish forecasts was smaller than in any succeeding year. Taking a glaring example, in the rising market of 1928 the ratio of bullish to bearish forecasts was only four to three. In 1931, when the market declined 54 per cent, there were sixteen bullish forecasts to every three bearish.
STATISTICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF RESULTS
In an attempt to illuminate the problem of whether the records of all these forecasters lay within the limits of pure chance, we compiled 24 records, identical with those of the 24 forecasters as to the total period covered, but having purely fortuitous advices applied to random intervals within these perids. For example, to compile a purely chance record to compare with the actual record of a forecaster whose operations covered 230 weeks from January 1, 1928, to June 1, 1932, we first determined the average number of changes of advice for such a period, which was 33. Cards numbered from 1 to 229 were shuffled, drawn, reshuffled, drawn, in all 33 times. Thus 33 random dates were selected as of which forecasts were to be changed. The investment policies which were to apply to the intervals between those dates were derived in similar fortuitous fashion, by drawing 33 times from nine cards on each of which a different one of the nine possible investment policies was noted.
It only remained to relate these random advices to a stock market index, cumulate the results, relate them, as we had done with the records of the actual forecasters, to the average of all chances for the period, and subtract 100. Thus we had a list of 24 purely chance fore-casting records, shown in Table IV , to compare with the records of the actual prophets. In any attempt at interpreting the significance of the performances of the various stock market forecasters we are embarrased by our inability to determine how often economic developments occur of sufficient importance to justify the revision of forecasts. This is tantamount to admitting that we do not know the true number of independent cases, or items, in the time series representing the various forecasting records. In these circumstances, probable errors for correlation coefficients, or for normal distributions, cannot constitute very exact measures of probability. We do know, however, since we are dealing with weekly publications, that the maximum possible number of forecasting opportunities is 52 a year. We also know that forecasts, on the average, undergo some degree of revision about 7 times a year. The correlation coefficients and probable errors, which constitute one of our tests of probability, have been worked out on both of these bases.
The record of Forecaster Number 1 was available to us for a period of only two years, during which he did not once change his advice. We therefore omitted his record from consideration in our statistical interpretation on the ground that inferences based on it would be relatively inconclusive. For the correlation test therefore, Forecasters Number 2, 3, 22 and 24 were chosen as representing the best and the worst whose records covered the entire period under analysis. The weekly forecasts of each of these four were correlated with the first differences of 100, which represented the average of all random frequency distributions. The probable error of the latter was found to be .086. Forecasters Number 2 and 3 showed averages of 100.098 and 100.103 respectively; each deviating from the theoretical average by amounts which were slightly greater than the probable error .086, but considerably less than twice this probable error. Forecasters Number 22 and 24 had averages of 99.674 and 99.711 respectively; less than the theoretical average by .326 and .289. Each of these differences was more than three, and less than four, times greater than the probable error .086. When a similar frequency distribution is made for the best purely random forecaster, it is found that the average was equal to 100.213, which is greater than that of Forecasters 2 and 3. The deviation from the theoretical average lies within three times the probable error of this theoretical average. 
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